Iraq Study Group report riddled with ambiguities

Following the release of the long-awaited Iraq Study Group (ISG) report on Dec. 6, much has been made of the report's call for the withdrawal of US combat troops from Iraq by early 2008. Calling the situation in Iraq "grave and deteriorating," the ISG called for a phase-out of the US combat role in Iraq and an intensification of efforts to train and deploy Iraqi forces. Among the 79 recommendations suggested by the 10-member panel co-chaired by former secretary of state James Baker and former congressman Lee Hamilton, the proposal that has garnered the most attention in the media is the call for a "phased withdrawal" by the beginning of 2008. "By the first quarter of 2008, subject to unexpected developments in the security situation on the ground, all combat brigades not necessary for force protection could be out of Iraq," the report states. According to a Dec. 10 New York Times article, front line combat troops in the 15 brigades carrying out the fighting in Iraq represent only about 23 percent of the 140,000 military personnel committed to the overall war effort there. On any given day, only about 11 percent of the Army and Marine Corps personnel in Iraq are carrying out purely offensive operations. Even counting others, whose main job is defensive or who perform security missions to stabilize the country for economic reconstruction and political development, only half of the US forces might be considered combat troops. US soldiers assigned to join Iraqi units as advisers and trainers–fighting alongside the Iraqis when necessary, with other combat forces on call in case of emergency–must be backed up by the full array of drivers, cooks, guards, planners, intelligence analysts, communications teams, helicopter crews, mechanics and medical units without which no military operation can be mounted. According to Pentagon statistics, about 23 percent of the troops currently assigned to the Iraq mission conduct primarily combat jobs. The 15 combat brigades–each with an official roster of about 3,500 and totaling about 52,500 soldiers and marines in Iraq–make up well over a third of the overall force. But each brigade includes units that provide support, logistics and security for those troops conducting direct combat operations. Another ambiguous element of the withdrawal proposal is the phrase "subject to unexpected developments" in regards to the security situation in Iraq. Considering the volatility of the situation on the ground in Iraq, with daily car bombings, mass kidnappings and vicious sectarian strife, "unexpected developments" could come in a variety of different forms, preventing the potential scale-back of US troops from the besieged country. The phrase could also give the Bush administration ample leeway to disregard the ISG's suggestions, citing "unexpected developments" as their excuse for disregarding the panel's advice. The report also calls for urgently convening all of Iraq's neighbors, including Syria and Iran, as part of a comprehensive "New Diplomatic Offensive" designed to both stabilize Iraq and to address "key regional issues," including the Arab-Israeli conflict. "There must be a renewed and sustained commitment by the United States to a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace on all fronts: Lebanon, Syria, and President George W. Bush's June 2002 commitment to a two-state solution for Israel and Palestine," the report asserted. It called for the US to "immediately seek the creation of the Iraq International Support Group" to include all of the country's neighbors, as well as key countries in the region and the world. All of Iraq's neighbors, including Syria and Iran, according to the ISG, "favor a unified Iraq that is strong enough to maintain its territorial integrity, but not so powerful as to threaten its neighbors." "Under the aegis of the New Diplomatic Offensive and the Support Group, the United States should engage directly with Iran and Syria in order to try to obtain their commitment to constructive policies toward Iraq and other regional issues," the report stated, noting that Washington should "consider incentives to engage them constructively, much as it did successfully with Libya." While stressing the need for dialogue with Iran, the panel also emphasized the need to keep US forces prepared for other "dangers in the world" such as "security contingencies… in Iran and North Korea." The ISG also highlights the US troop shortages in Afghanistan. The report says: "The huge focus of US political, military, and economic support has necessarily diverted attention from Afghanistan…. It is critical for the US to provide additional political, economic, and military support." It cites US NATO commander James Jones' request for more troops, and says "The United States should respond positively to that request," leaving open the possibility that some US troops in Iraq might be "redeployed" to Afghanistan. One aspect of the ISG report that is fairly clear-cut are the recommendations for the Iraqi oil industry. The first part of the first chapter outlines Iraq's importance to its region, the US and the world with this reminder: "It has the world's second-largest known oil reserves." The group then proceeds to give very specific and radical recommendations as to what the United States should do to secure those reserves. If the proposals are followed, Iraq's national oil industry will be commercialized and opened to foreign firms. Recommendation 62 says the US government should help draft an oil law that "creates a fiscal and legal framework for investment." It further recommends that the US, in conjunction with the International Monetary Fund, should "press Iraq to continue reducing subsidies in the energy sector... until Iraqis pay market prices for oil products...." Recommendation 63 says the US should "assist" Iraqi leaders in privatizing the national oil industry into a "commercial enterprise" to encourage investment by the multinational oil companies. Overall, the report's recommendations have received a tepid response from the White House and many conservatives. President Bush, making his first extended comments on the study the day after its release, seemed to push back against two of its most fundamental recommendations: pulling back US combat brigades from Iraq over the next 15 months, and engaging in direct talks with Iran and Syria. He said he needed to be "flexible and realistic" in making decisions about troop movements, and he set conditions for talks with Iran and Syria that neither country was likely to accept. While the president said he would give the report serious consideration, he said he did not intend to accept all 79 recommendations. "Congress isn't going to accept every recommendation in the report," Bush said, "and neither will the administration." While the incoming Democratic chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Sen. Carl Levin, said he would be inclined to cosponsor a resolution endorsing the report's general principles, if not its specific recommendations, his counterpart on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Sen. Joseph Biden, deplored the ISG's rejection of his plan for creating three semi-independent regions in Iraq as the best political solution to the sectarian conflict there. In a speech to the Israel Policy Forum on Dec. 6, Biden also denounced the ISG's linking of Iraq with progress in resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict, calling it "dangerously naïve." A number of Democrats, notably the incoming chairman of the powerful House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, Rep. John Murtha, said they were disappointed that the ISG had not called for a more rapid withdrawal according to a specific timetable. Commenting on the ISG's recommendation of a 15-month conditional phase-out of the US combat role, Murtha said: "This is not different from the current policy."