Iraq War plan assumed 5,000 troops would remain by end of 2006

The US Central Command's (CentCom) war plan for invading Iraq postulated in August 2002 that the US would have only 5,000 troops left in Iraq as of December 2006, according to CentCom's PowerPoint briefing slides obtained through the Freedom of Information Act and posted on the internet by the National Security Archive. The PowerPoint slides, prepared by CentCom planners for Gen. Tommy Franks under code name "POLO STEP," for briefings during 2002 for President Bush, the National Security Council, former defense secretary Donald Rumsfeld, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Franks' commanders, refer to the "Phase IV" post-hostilities period as "unknown" and "months" in duration, but assume that US forces would be almost completely "redeployed" out of Iraq within 45 months of the invasion (i.e. December 2006). "Completely unrealistic assumptions about a post-Saddam Iraq permeate these war plans," said National Security Archive Executive Director Thomas Blanton. "First, they assumed that a provisional government would be in place by 'D-Day,' then that the Iraqis would stay in their garrisons and be reliable partners, and finally that the post-hostilities phase would be a matter of mere 'months.' All of these were delusions." The PowerPoint slides reflect the continuous debate over the size of the invasion force that took place within the Bush administration. In late November 2001, Bush asked Rumsfeld about the status of plans for war with Iraq. He asked for an updated approach, but did not want to attract attention. Rumsfeld ordered Gen. Franks to prepare a commander's estimate of improvements needed, and Franks convened a planning group that adopted the code-word POLO STEP. POLO STEP was a coded compartment created during the Clinton administration to encompass covert Iraq and counter-terrorism plans and activities. In the mid-1990s, the compartment specifically included the targeting of Osama bin Laden. Following the Sept. 11 attacks, CentCom, among other military and national security components, used the designation to cover planning for the war in Iraq. In mid-2002, military analyst William Arkin obtained a leaked copy of a briefing on the Iraq plans and revealed the existence of POLO STEP in an op-ed for the Los Angeles Times. According to Arkin, the revelation unleashed the fury of Gen. Franks and Rumsfeld who immediately ordered a probe of the leak that lasted until the end of 2003 and subjected more than 1,000 military and contractor personnel to sometimes repeated questioning. The slides in the internet posting are a compilation reflecting various iterations in war planning. The US government maintains plans for conflict with a multitude of possible adversaries. The contingency operating plan for Iraq–OPLAN 1003-98–had last been fully reviewed in 1996 and was updated in 1998. It envisioned an invasion force of more than 380,000 troops. Former CentCom commander Gen. Anthony Zinni (who saw gaps in the plan–particularly in regard to the post-war order) organized a war game–Desert Crossing–in 1999 to examine additional contingencies. Under pressure from Rumsfeld for a leaner force, Zinni's successor, Gen. Franks, reduced the number to 275,000 in the commander's estimate he gave to the president on December 28, 2001. During the course of 2002 alternative versions of the plan were developed reflecting various assumptions about levels of allied support–"robust", "reduced" or "unilateral"–and about the amount of lead time available between the order to invade and the deployment of forces. Under the "Generated Start" option Bush would have provided CentCom with 30 days notice for war, and 60 days to deploy. Following Rumsfeld's mandate to reduce deployment time to prepare for any contingency, Franks developed the alternative "Running Start" option: conflict would begin with escalating air strikes followed by ground war as troops were deployed. By mid-August 2002 a Hybrid concept had been developed–the US military would quickly mobilize forces in the region, initiate an air strike campaign, then launch a ground invasion.